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Executive Summary 
  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 consists of several provisions 
designed to promote the obtainment of affordable health insurance coverage for all Americans.  
In order to facilitate access to information on available prices and policies for this coverage, the 
law requires states to decide whether to operate their own healthcare insurance exchange or 
join a partnership or federal exchange.  While many states proceeded with the implementation 
of state-based exchanges despite a challenge to the law in the Supreme Court, other states did 
not.  This paper explores the influence that certain and health market characteristics may have 
had in a state’s decision on whether to adopt a state-based exchange prior to the Supreme 
Court judgment on June 28, 2012.   
 For my analysis, I develop a series of Kaplan-Meier survival models for my variables to 
identify patterns in the risk of adoption. Time to adoption of state-based exchanges serves as 
my dependent variable. In order to assess the relationships between variables and time to 
adoption, I also produce a multivariate Weibull regression model that shows hazard ratios 
associated with adopting by the designated date.  For this model, I include factor scores for my 
federal and state political variables to address multicollinearity. 
 The results of the Kaplan-Meier models demonstrate states that are more liberal 
politically were more likely to adopt state-based healthcare insurance exchanges prior to the 
Supreme Court judgment.  Further analysis of the variables in my regression model shows that 
certain state-level political characteristics, encompassed within one of the factor scores, had 
influence on a state’s decision.  Specifically, the number of Democrats in a state’s executive 
office and legislature has a positive and statistically significant relationship on adoption time.  
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Background 
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, a piece of sweeping legislation that focused on the reform of the private 
insurance market in an attempt to allow better access to healthcare for uninsured American 
citizens.  The legislation as passed was highly controversial, with several efforts being made by 
the Republican Party to repeal the law on constitutional grounds.  On June 28th, 2012, the 
Supreme Court’s upheld most of the provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA) in their decision regarding the case National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius.1  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, many states embarked on the implementation of 
groundwork programs to comply with the provisions of the PPACA, such as the creation of 
state-based health insurance exchanges, new competitive marketplaces in which individuals 
and small businesses can choose among industry options for comprehensive health insurance 
plans. 2 Officials in other states, perhaps averse to the act itself due to political ideology or 
concerned about financial implications with regards to state socioeconomic characteristics, 
refrained from early establishment of these exchanges.    Due to existing deadlines for achieving 
waypoints in the process of setting up these exchanges, early inaction has left some states 
scrambling to meet these required deadlines and may result in states being mandated to join 
federally-run exchanges.  Some states have simply chosen to forego setting up a state-based 
                                                          
1
 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 11-393 (2012) 
2
 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.  Status of State Health Insurance Exchange Implementation.  Online.  
Retrieved from: http://www.cbpp.org/files/CBPP-Analysis-on-the-Status-of-State-Exchange-
Implementation.pdfhttp://www.cbpp.org/files/CBPP-Analysis-on-the-Status-of-State-Exchange-
Implementation.pdf. January 29, 2013 
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exchange and instead will join a federal or partnership exchange, which are both options under 
the law.    
While states have the option of joining federally-run or partnership exchanges, states 
are required by Section 2001(b) of the PPACA to comply with a maintenance of effort (MOE) 
provision that asserts that states must maintain the same eligibility standards, methodologies, 
and procedures for their Medicaid programs as were in effect on March 23, 2010 until the time 
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines the operational status of a state’s 
health insurance exchange.3  A failure to comply with this provision means a state may risk 
losing all of its federal matching Medicaid funding, so a state’s progress in establishing or 
joining an exchange has a direct bearing on the administration of their Medicaid program.  In 
addition, a recent Commonwealth Fund study finds states that have not yet enacted steps 
towards complying with the PPACA could be faced with challenges in protecting consumers due 
to nuances within the law. These nuances include the presence of possible loopholes and 
inconsistencies in the enforcement and regulation of health insurance4. 
The implications for a state’s citizens based upon the type of exchange the state decided 
to pursue are potentially numerous.   A recent policy brief from Health Affairs and the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation explores these issues.  Threats cited within the brief include the 
following:  the possibility of adverse selection and instability in the health market due to 
                                                          
3
 Congressional Research Service. Memorandum: Selected Issues Related to the Effect of NFIB v Sebelius on 
Medicaid Expansion Requirements in Section 2001 of the Affordable Care Act. Online.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/aca_medicaid_expansion_memo_1.pdf. July 16, 2012. 
4
 Keith, Katie, Kevin W. Lucia, and Sabrina Corlette.  Implementing the Affordable Care Act:  State Action on the 
2014 Market Reforms.  Online.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2013/1662_Keith_implementing_
ACA_state_action_2014_reform_brief_v2.pdf. February 2013. 
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regulation differences between state exchanges and federal exchanges; the complexity of state 
laws that a federal exchange may need to comply with; and the question of whether citizens of 
states involved with federal exchanges qualify for insurance purchasing subsidies.5  This latter 
point may have particular impact on the consumer market and the interpretation of this caveat 
is currently under litigation.  Therefore, mechanisms of funding insurance for those not cleared 
for subsidies under that portion of law could prove to be problematic.   
This paper examines several political, administrative, and health market factors that 
may have acted as valid predictors of a state’s adoption of measures to implement state-based 
health insurance exchanges in conjunction with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
Specifically, the paper will focus on time to adoption of exchange legislation or executive orders 
within the time frame of the act’s passage in March of 2010 to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
June of 2012.  It will explore patterns that may demonstrate the extent to which political 
variables impacted time to adoption.  In addition, economic and social factors, such as state 
fiscal conditions, state administrative capacities, and characteristics associated with individual 
state health markets will be explored for their possible contribution towards a state’s decision 
toward quicker adoption.  The study could provide some further insight into the overall 
predictive power of numerous factors in helping to determine a state’s willingness to actively 
seek to comply with federal mandate legislation. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Goodell, Sarah.  Health Policy Brief: Federally Facilitated Exchanges.  Health Affairs, January 21, 2013. 
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Literature Review 
The decision of a particular state on whether to act early on instituting provisions of the 
PPACA prior to the Supreme Court deciding upon its constitutionality could be linked to 
dominant political ideologies within the particular state instead of waiting out of an abundance 
of caution.  Immediately following the passage of the PPACA in 2010, the Republican Party 
began a series of campaigns across the country focusing on a promise to repeal the bill.  In 
January 2011, a Republican controlled House of Representatives voted 245 to 189 to repeal the 
bill despite the obvious obstacle for success presented by a Democratically-controlled Senate 
and White House.  The vote for repeal was viewed as a symbolic gesture.6    
 In examining the role that political and economic factors may play in a state’s decision 
to adopt early state-based exchange legislation, an understanding of existing literature on the 
subject of state political decision-making is necessary.  Central to the idea that overarching 
political ideologies carry weight in the decision to implement a specific policy are 
macroeconomic partisan policy theories, which hold that political parties promote policies that 
are consistent with preferences of their core constituencies.7 Further, a 1992 D.A. Hibbs, Jr. 
article states that partisanship is an important determinant in the variation in policy choices 
and policy outputs in constitutional democracies.8   
                                                          
6
 New York Times.  Health Care Reform.  Online.  Retrieved from:  
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/health_insurance_and_managed_
care/health_care_reform/index.html. Updated November 8, 2012. 
7
 Carlsen, Fredrik.  Rational Partisan Theory: Empirical Evidence for the United States.  Southern Economic Journal 
1998, 65(1), 64-82. 
8
 Hibbs, D.A., Jr. (1992). Partisan theory after fifteen years, European Journal of Political Economy 8. Page 316. 
 8 
In addition, a Manfred Schmidt exploration into the extent of party influence on public 
policy finds that it is contingent upon a variety of factors, including socioeconomic challenges 
and economic resources present at any particular time, the degree of vulnerability of national 
economies to international markets, the distribution of power resources among social classes 
and the incumbent party’s lead of the opposition party, measured by differences in vote and 
seat shares.9 These studies and theories could lend themselves to the notion that a state’s 
status of implementation of health insurance exchanges prior to the Supreme Court’s decision 
may have been motivated by partisan-controlled disposition within each respective state.  
 In terms of measuring partisan disposition, state political ideologies can be found within 
a data set provided by a website operated by Richard Fording, Professor and Chair of the 
Department of Political Science at the University of Alabama.  The data is current through 2010, 
the year in which the Affordable Care Act was passed and signed into law.  This state ideological 
measure was developed using interest group ratings from each member of Congress in each 
respective state.10  The measure computes average ratings from the Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA) and Committee on Political Education (COPE), which were chosen due to their 
consistency in reporting over a large time frame (1960 – 1993).   A measure using this index is 
used in a 2003 article examining links between political institutions and policy choices to 
                                                          
9
 Schmidt, Manfred G. When parties matter: A review of the possibility and limits of partisan influence on public 
policy.  European Journal of Political Research 30, September 1996.  Page 156 
10
 Berry, William, Evan J. Ringquist, Richard Fording, Russell Hanson. Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in 
the American States, 1960-93. From the American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 1.  Retrieved from:  
http://www.bama.ua.edu/~rcfording/AJPS_1998.pdf 
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demonstrate how citizen and state government ideologies can influence state legislative 
decisions11.   
 Analysis of political and socio-economic factors within the United States can help to 
paint a clearer picture of their effects on state policy decisions. A 1989 study by Erickson et. al. 
shows that party control of a state legislature may not in itself be a great predictor of state 
policy.12 While electoral politics are found to be important, Erikson and his colleagues assert 
that elected officials respond more to state opinion than predominant political ideology.  This 
state opinion is derived in part by the ideology of the voting population but is also influenced by 
other factors.  Electoral success thus hinges upon a dominant party’s responsiveness to state 
opinion, with parties sliding more towards the center of the political spectrum once in office.  
Another study by Erickson et. al. on state political culture finds that the state of residence for 
an individual can act as a predictor of self-identified party and ideological affiliation.13 
This notion of state opinion being a driver for state policy decision is supported in a R.D. 
Brown study of coalitional influence within and between states regarding the welfare effort.  
The study finds that class-based party supports in states played an important role in 
determining a state’s welfare policy, with parties dividing the electorate in different ways.14 
                                                          
11
 Besley, Timothy and Anne Case. Journal of Economic Literature , Vol. 41, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), 42.  
12
 Erikson, Robert, Gerald C. Wright, Jr. and John P. McIver.  Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy in the 
United States.  The American Political Science Review Vol. 83, No. 3) pp. 742-744. 
 
13
 Erickson, Robert, John P. McIver, Gerald C. Wright.  State Political Culture and Public Opinion.  1987.  The 
American Political Science Review.  81 No. 3, 797. 
14
 Brown, RD.  Party cleavages and welfare effort in the American states. 1995. The American Political Science 
Review 89, (1): 23-23, 
http://ezproxy.uky.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/214428803?accountid=11836 (accessed 
March 16, 2013). 
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These two findings indicate that simple party politics are not enough to explain a state’s 
decision to implement certain policies.  
If state opinion is predicated upon belief characteristics of a voting constituency that 
contain factors other than simply political ideology and elected officials are motivated to stay in 
office by appealing to the state’s constituency, it is logical that socio-economic characteristics 
play a role in constructing state public opinion that leads to state policy.  For example, 
unemployment in a state has been seen to affect voting patterns at the gubernatorial level, 
especially in situations where the candidate’s party also controls a state legislature.  
Furthermore, a 2005 study on economic voting finds that relationships exist at the state level 
between economics and elections, especially in states with diverse economies. 15  
In support of this notion, a 1969 study on inter-party competition and welfare policies 
finds that socioeconomic characteristics within a state contributed to variations in welfare 
policies, including such policy characteristics as aid to the blind, aid to dependent children, and 
old age assistance.16  These studies on welfare policy are of particular note to my paper 
because it links social and economic considerations to state opinion.   Thus, determining 
appropriate socioeconomic measures in states that are relevant to the Affordable Care Act is an 
important aspect of my analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Ebeid, Michael and Jonathan Rodden.  Economic Geography and Economic Voting: Evidence from the US States. 
2006.  Retrieved from: http://www.stanford.edu/~jrodden/bjps_ebeid_rodden_2006.pdf. 
16
 Dawson, Richard E. and James A. Robinson.  Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in 
the American States.  The Journal of Politics.  Vol. 25, No. 2 (May, 1963) 287.   
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Research Design 
I analyze whether several political, administrative, and health market factors potentially 
influenced a state’s early decision to participate in one aspect of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.  I chose to examine activity related to the establishment of state-based 
healthcare insurance exchanges in each respective state. This portion of the Act can be seen as 
essentially laying the groundwork platform upon which the majority of the Act’s provisions can 
then be carried out.  My unit of analysis for this study will be state governments.  Specifically, I 
will analyze the status of state governments in acting on the implementation of health 
insurance exchanges. 
Following the selection of this component, I need to determine what exactly would 
constitute participation in establishing healthcare insurance exchanges.  For the purpose of this 
comparative study, defining what type of activity indicates willingness to participate and the 
time frame for occurrence are crucial components of my analysis.  The Supreme Court case 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, outlined above, afforded an 
opportunity to identify a natural break between early participation and non-participation or 
later participation.  The Supreme Court’s decision date of June 28, 2012 on the Act’s 
constitutionality will be used as the cut-off date, establishing time to adoption as my 
dependent variable.   
 I produce a series of Kaplan-Meier survivor curves, looking at how time until adoption 
varies for different categories of each of my chosen variables.  Then I conduct a multivariate 
Weibull survival analysis to further determine whether these variables affect how early or late 
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states begin to implement health insurance exchanges.  In order to draw the descriptive 
survivor curves in the first part of my analysis, I designated categorical values for each of my 
variables where continuous data was observed.  A detailed account of these designations is 
available in the following section.  For the multivariate analysis, I keep the continuous variables 
on their original scale.   
My null hypothesis (H0) is that the analyzed political and economic variables show no 
pattern of effect on time until adoption.  The alternative hypothesis (H1) is that the following 
political and economic variables should predict a shorter time until adoption:  voted for Obama 
in 2008, presence of a Democratic governor, a full-time state legislature, liberal state political 
ideology, a decisive Democratic margin of victory in the 2008 Presidential election, a simple 
majority of Democratic members of the congressional House of Representatives, a simple 
majority of Democratic members of a state legislature’s House of Representatives, a simple 
majority of Democratic senators in a state’s legislature, a higher number of Democratic 
senators in Congress, a higher percentage of uninsured residents, a higher percentage of 
residents with diabetes, a higher grade within the Government Performance Project, and a 
higher GDP per capita. In a previous analysis of only federal-level political determinants related 
to time to adoption, my model results indicated that I was able reject the null hypothesis.  In 
this study, I explore whether these findings hold up when controlling for additional alternative 
political and economic explanations through the use of a regression model.  
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Description of Variables 
In my comparison, the time to adoption of healthcare insurance exchange legislation 
serves as my dependent variable.  To measure relationships between this variable and the 
control variables in my model, I set the ending date as June 28, 2012.  This data was collected 
from a frequently updated database managed by the National Conference of State Legislatures, 
a non-profit organization that serves legislators and staffs of all fifty states by providing 
research, issue tracking, and technical assistance to policymakers17.  The source of the data is 
updated frequently and archives of past updated resources pertaining to this topic are available 
for use.  Thus, I was able to extract data that referenced the exact time frame associated with 
each state’s action on this activity, ensuring that the data I have obtained for my model reflects 
statuses consistent with my designated threshold date.  
 The analysis looks at a set of political and economic variables that may show effects on 
whether a state engaged in early state-based exchange implementation.  My first explanatory 
variable is a value of prevailing political ideology in a state.  The data is depicts state ideology as 
of2010, the year in which the Affordable Care Act was passed and signed into law.  The index 
measures state political ideology on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being the most conservative and 
100 being the most liberal.  My categorical designation denotes an assignment of 0 for more 
conservative ideologies, 1 for more moderate ideologies, and 2 for more liberal ideologies. 
                                                          
17
 State Actions to Address Health Insurance Exchanges, Updated October 12.  National Conference of State 
Legislatures.  Retrieved from: http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-health-
benefit-exch.aspx 
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 In addition to the main explanatory variable of state political ideology, I include other 
federal-level political explanatory variables that control for voting patterns consistent with the 
political situation present during my specified time frame for adoption.  First, I include data on 
whether a state’s electoral votes were awarded to President Barack Obama during the 2008 
Presidential Election.18  The data is presented in the form of dummy variables, with an 
assignment of 0 indicating that a state did not vote for Barack Obama in 2008 and an 
assignment of 1 indicating that a state voted for Barack Obama in 2008.  This measure is used 
to demonstrate political willingness towards enacting legislation developed by the Obama 
Administration, with the assumption that states that voted for Obama in 2008 will be more 
likely to participate in the enactment state-based exchange legislation than those states that 
did not vote for Obama in 2008.  
 I include explanatory variables that identify the number and political party affiliation of 
Congressmen from each respective state.  I use data from senate.gov19  and house.gov20 to 
identify four different explanatory variables for each state:  the number of Republican Senators, 
the number of Democratic Senators, the number of Republican members of the House of 
Representatives, and the number of Democratic members of the House of Representatives.  In 
order to standardize my data, I assign two Independent members of the House of 
Representatives to the Democratic Party designation due to their respective political views 
being more closely aligned with that party. Values for Nebraska at the state level have been 
                                                          
18
 Election Results 2008, New York Times. Updated Tuesday, December 9, 2008.  Retrieved from: 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/map.html 
19
 United States Senate website.  Retrieved from: http://www.senate.gov/ 
20
 United States House of Representatives website.  Retrieved from:  http://www.house.gov/ 
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omitted due to their status as a unicameral state legislature.21 The House of Representatives 
values have been assigned as a categorical value indicating simple majority.  An assignment of 0 
represents a Republican simple majority, a 1 represents an even number of members between 
both parties, and a 2 represents a Democratic simple majority.  These variables provide further 
indication of citizen voting patterns at the federal-level and could help to explain the speed of 
adoption for this type of legislation.  A state with a larger number and simple majority of 
Democratic Senators and members of the House of Representatives could demonstrate faster 
adoption under my hypothesis. 
  I use the explanatory variable of each party’s margin of victory in the 2008 Presidential 
Election, by percentage, in each respective state. 22 The margin of victory is important to 
control for in this model because it acts as a proxy for the competitiveness of the election in 
each state, demonstrating the degree of popular political support for each party in the 2008 
election and aids in possibly explaining variations in support for the Affordable Care Act. 
Categorical values are assigned as a 0 for a decisive (greater than 10%) Republican victory, 1 for 
a closer margin, and 2 for a decisive Democratic victory. 
In terms of state-level political variables, I include the number of representatives for 
each chamber of a respective state’s legislature, delineated by party affiliation.23 In both cases, 
a Republican simple majority is assigned a 0, an equal number of members is assigned a 1, and 
                                                          
21
 Powell, Lynda W.  The Influence of Campaign Contributions in State Legislatures: The Effects of Institutions and 
Politics.  University of Michigan Press, 2012, Pg. 27 
22
 A Tale of Two Elections: Results from State Election Offices as Reported by the Federal Election Commission.  
2009. Retrieved from: http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2008/chrneday08/results08mov.html 
23
 Party Composition of State Legislatures.  National Conference of State Legislatures. 2012.  Retrieved from:  
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/statevote-charts.aspx 
 16 
a Democratic simple majority is assigned a 2. I also include the party affiliation of each 
respective state’s governor, assigning dummy variables of 0 to Republican governors and a 1 for 
Democratic governors24.  States with higher amounts of Democrats in their legislatures and 
states with a Democratic governor will demonstrate faster times to adoption under my 
hypothesis.   
It is also important to control for health market factors that may have effects on 
healthcare-related decisions among state leaders.  I include two health market measures within 
my model.  First, the percentage of uninsured residents in each state is used to show the 
severity of the uninsured problem within each state.25 Categorical values of 0 are assigned for 
relatively low (less than 10%) uninsured, a 1 for relatively moderate (10% - 20%) uninsured, and 
a 2 for relatively high (greater than 20%) uninsured.  A higher percentage of uninsured 
residents in a state is predicted to positively affect earlier adoption of state-based exchanges. 26  
Demand for health insurance should be affected by health conditions. I use the percentage of 
population in each state with diabetes as an indicator of health conditions.27 Dummy values are 
assigned as a 0 for a rate of less than 10% and a 1 for a rate over 10%.  Higher per capita risks 
are assumed to positively affect earlier time to adoption.    
Next, the capacity of a state’s government is included as a measure of the capability of 
states to administer programs such as healthcare insurance exchanges.  For state capacity, I use 
                                                          
24
 Former Governors’ Bios.  National Governors Association.  2013.  Retrieved from:  
http://www.nga.org/cms/FormerGovBios 
25
 Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, states (2010-2011), U.S. (2011).  The Henry Kaiser Family 
Foundation.  2013.  Retrieved from:  http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=125&cat=3 
26
 State and County Quickfacts.  US Census Bureau.  2013.  Retrieved from:  
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html 
27
 Obesity and Diabetes: Across States, a Clear Relationship.  Gallup Wellbeing.  2009.  Retrieved from:  
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122405/obesity-diabetes-across-states-clear-relationship.aspx 
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dummy variables to assign the status of a legislature as being full-time, hybrid, or part-time28.  
Full-time legislatures are assigned a 2, hybrid legislatures are assigned a 1, and part-time 
legislatures are assigned a 0.  Full-time legislatures are assumed to function at a higher level of 
effectiveness due to increased time resources and support staffing.   
I also include a measure for a state’s performance grade within the Pew Charitable 
Trusts’ Government Performance Project.  This initiative, completed in 2008, assesses the 
quality of management within each state, indicating an evaluation of a state’s capability to 
administer its programs.29 I assign states a value that equates each grade to its grade point 
average equivalent.30  Categorical values are then assigned as a 0 for the 1.0 – 1.9 range, a 1 for 
the 2.0 – 2.9 range, and a 2 for the 3.0 – 4.0 range.  Higher grades are expected to have a 
positive effect on earlier time to adoption.  
 Finally, I include a measure of gross domestic product per capita for each state for a 
general demonstration of state economic health, calculating each figure by using gross 
domestic product data available at the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic 
Analysis website in conjunction with population data from the U.S Census Bureau.31 States 
within the range of $28,293 to $35,000 are assigned a 0, $35,001 - $45,000 a 1, and greater 
than $45,001 a 2.  
                                                          
28
 Full and Part-Time Legislatures.  National Conference of State Legislatures.  2009.  Retrieved from:  
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx 
29
 Grading the States 2008 Report.  The Pew Charitable Trusts: State and Consumer Initiatives.  March 3, 2008.  
Retrieved from:  http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/grading-the-states-2008-report-85899379355 
30
 GPA Conversion Chart.  Princeton Review.  2013.  Retrieved from:  
http://inquiry.princetonreview.com/leadgentemplate/GPA_popup.asp 
31
 National Economic Accounts: Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Bureau of Economic Analysis.  February 11, 2013.  
Retrieved from:  http://www.bea.gov/national/ 
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 A summary of these dummy variable designations can be found in Table 1 below: 
 
In addition to the Kaplan-Meier survival analyses, I also include a Weibull regression 
model for each continuous variable.  It is used to help explain relationships between a variable’s 
entry into the model and the designated failure date of June 28, 2012.  It allows the opportunity 
to identify the hazard ratio for each variable or simply the chances of a variable’s impact on a 
Table 1: Summary of Categorical Variable Assignment for Kaplan-Meier Analysis 
Name Description of Categorical Variables Ex. Signs Source 
Dependent Variable 
DateofAdoptionorOrder 
Date of adoption of exchange legislation or 
executive order N/A www.ncsl.org 
Independent Variables       
VotedforObamain2008 Voted for Obama in 2008 - yes (0), no (1) 
0 = - 
1 = + www.nytimes.com 
State_Governor 
Party affiliation of governor - Republican (0), 
Democrat (1) 
0 = - 
1 = + www.nga.org 
Professional_Legislature 
Type of state legislature  -full-time (2), hybrid 
(1), part-time (0) 
0 = - 
1 = neutral 
2 = + www.ncsl.org 
IdeoDum 
State Political Ideology - conservative (0), 
moderate (1), liberal (2) 
0 = - 
1 = neutral 
2 = + Berry, et. Al (1998) 
FHouDum 
Simple majority of Representatives in 
Congressional House - Republican (0), equal 
(1), Democrat (2) 
0 = - 
1 = neutral 
2 = + www.house.gov 
MarVicDum 
Margin of Victory in 2008 Presidential 
Election -decisive  
Republican (0), close (1),  decisive Democrat 
(2) 
0 = - 
1 = neutral 
2 = + 
Federal Election 
Commission (2009) 
StHouseDum 
Simple majority of state House of 
Representatives - Republican (0), equal (1), 
Democrat (2) 
0 = - 
1 = neutral 
2 = + www.ncsl.org 
StSenDum 
Simple majority of state Senators -Republican 
(0),neutral (1), Democrat (2) 
0 = - 
1 = neutral 
2 = + www.ncsl.org 
FedSenateDem Number of Democratic senators in US Senate + www.senate.gov 
FedSenateRep Number of Republican senators in US Senate - www.senate.gov 
UninsDum 
Percentage of uninsured residents - relatively 
low (0), relatively moderate (1), relatively 
high (2) 
0 = - 
1 = neutral 
2 = + 
www.statehealthfacts.o
rg  
DiabDum 
Percentage of residents with diabetes - below 
10% (0), above 10% (1) 
0 = - 
1 = + www.gallup.com 
GovPerDum 
Grade on Pew Research Center's Government 
Performance  
Project -1.1 to 1.9 (0), 2.0 to 2.9 (1), 3.0 - 3.9 
(2) 
0 = - 
1 = neutral 
2 = + www.pewstates.org 
GDPDum 
Gross domestic product per capita - $28,293 
– $35,000 (0), $35,001 – $45,000 (1) $45,001 
+ (2)  
0 = - 
1 = neutral 
2 = + www.bea.gov 
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state’s adoption time. This technique is also useful to my analysis because it specifies a 
parameter that measures the overall rate of adoption risk as the time interval nears the 
designated deadline.  I use a 95% confidence interval in my analysis, meaning that associated p-
values of .05 or less are statistically significant.  The formula for assessing the hazard ratio is as 
follows: ( 1 – Hazard Ratio) x 100 = Percent Influence on Outcome 
As several of my explanatory variables are highly correlated, I also include a factor 
analysis to extract the common variance among them.  Summary statistics for my data are shown 
below in Table 2: 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Date of Adoption or Order  50 10/28/2010 609 4/12/2006 4/12/2012 
State Political Ideology (index) 50 47.42779 15.46769 18.06953 86.18446 
Voted for Obama in 2008 (dummy of 0 or 1) 50 0.56 0.5014265 0 1 
Republican Senators in Congress (count) 50 0.94 0.8184106 0 2 
Democratic Senators in Congress (count) 50 1.06 0.8184106 0 2 
Republicans in Congressional House (count) 50 4.84 5.120427 0 23 
Democrats in Congressional House (count) 50 3.84 5.686935 0 34 
Margin of Victory in 2008 Election (percentage) 50 16.26% 981.57% 0.14% 45.27% 
State Governor Party Affiliation (dummy of 0 or 1) 50 0.4 0.4948717 0 1 
Republicans in State Senate (count) 49 21.2449 9.143601 1 37 
Democrats in State Senate (count) 49 18.08163 8.509399 4 35 
Republicans in State House (count) 49 59.65306 42.15821 8 294 
Democrats in State House (count) 49 50.79592 27.19833 10 126 
Uninsured residents (percentage) 50 14.68% 4.02% 4.46% 24.24% 
Diabetic residents (percentage) 50 10.76% 1.83% 6.30% 15.40% 
Professional Legislature Status (categorical value of 
0, 1, or 2) 
50 0.84 0.7384485 0 2 
Government Performance Project Grades (GPA 
equivalent) 
50 2.616 0.5056255 1.3 3.6 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (dollars) 50 $41,284.54  8108.248 $28,293  $63,159  
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Results and Analysis 
Kaplan-Meier Interpretations 
 The following section contains the results of my Kaplan-Meier models for each 
variable and a discussion of how the results either support or diverge from my alternative 
hypothesis.   
Figure 1: Voted for Obama in 2008 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates that states that voted for Obama in 2008 were more likely to 
adopt overall than those that did not, which supports my alternative hypothesis for this 
variable.   
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Figure 2: State Political Ideology 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates that states that are ideologically more liberal on the index I used 
for measurement were more likely to adopt than states that were more conservative, with 
more moderate states falling in the middle.  This pattern supports my alternative hypothesis.   
 
Figure 3: Republican Senators in Congress 
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Figure 3 shows with more Republican senators in Congress less likely to adopt, which 
supports my alternative hypothesis.  I did not include a model for Democratic senators due to 
that variable being perfectly correlated with this measure. 
Figure 4: Simple Majority of House of Representative Members in Congress
 
Figure 4 shows that states with a simple majority of Democratic representatives in the 
Congressional House were more likely to adopt, which supports my alternative hypothesis.   
 
Figure 5:  Margin of Victory in 2008 Presidential Election 
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Figure 5 demonstrates that states with a decisive Democratic margin of victory in the 
2008 Presidential Election were more likely to adopt, which supports my hypothesis.  States 
that exhibited a close margin of victory, in general, were quicker to adopt than those with a 
decisive Republican victory.   
Figure 6: State Governor Party Affiliation 
 
Figure 6 shows that states with Democratic governors were more likely to adopt than 
states with Republican governors, which supports my alternative hypothesis   
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Figure 7: Simple Majority of State Senate Representation 
 
Figure 7 shows that states with a simple majority of Democrats in their state Senates 
were more likely to adopt than those with a Republican simple majority, which supports my 
alternative hypothesis.   
Figure 8: Simple Majority of State House Representation 
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Figure 8 shows that states with a simple majority of Democrats in their state House of 
Representatives were more likely to adopt than states with a simple majority of Republicans, 
which supports my hypothesis.   
Figure 9: Percentage of Uninsured Residents in State 
 
Figure 9 shows that states with a lower number of uninsured residents were actually 
quicker to adopt than states with higher numbers of uninsured residents, which does not 
support my alternative hypothesis.  This variable was a measure of the overall healthcare 
market in a state and thus a state with higher levels uninsured would be quicker to act on 
adoption.  It should be noted that only four states possessed the lowest level of uninsured 
population (<10%) in my model, while the majority of states fell within the 10%-20% range.  
Eight states possessed an uninsured population percentage over 20%, with two of them 
(California and Nevada) adopting a state-based exchange.   
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Figure 10: Percentage of Residents with Diabetes in State 
 
Figure 10 shows that states with a relatively lower percentage of population with 
diabetes acted quicker towards adoption, which does not support my alternative hypothesis.    
My assumption in this case did not take into account potential regional correlations associated 
with such a condition, as the data for this variable indicates that no state in what would be 
considered the Southeast, a traditional Republican stronghold, possessed a relatively lower 
diabetes rate.   
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Figure 11: Professional Legislature Status 
 
Figure 11 shows that states with part-time legislatures were quicker to adopt than 
hybrid or full-time legislatures, which does not support my alternative hypothesis.  The 
difference between states with a hybrid legislature and a full-time legislature was nominal in 
terms of their time to adoption.     Full-time legislatures with relatively better access to time 
resources were anticipated to be able to implement state-based exchanges quicker.   
Figure 12: Government Performance Project Grades 
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Figure 12 shows that states that were graded relatively higher on the Pew Center’s 
Government Performance Project, a measure of state capacity in my model, were more likely to 
adopt than those states that were graded lower.  This supports my alternative hypothesis for 
this variable.   
Figure 13: Gross Domestic Product Per Capita
 
Figure 13 shows states with a relatively higher level of gross domestic product per capita 
were more likely to adopt than those states with lower levels, which supports my alternative 
hypothesis. The results for the relatively low levels and moderate levels did not show much 
difference.   
Factor Analysis 
 The factor analysis of my state and federal political variables demonstrated 
shows that two factors comprise are most associated in both cases. I generated two factor 
scores for both types of political variables to incorporate into my Weibull regression model.  
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Table 3 below demonstrates the factor loadings for my federal political variables.  Factor #1 is 
most highly correlated with the following variables: voted for Obama in 2008, state political 
ideology, and Democratic senators in Congress.  Factor #2 was most highly correlated with the 
number of Republican representatives in the congressional House and the number of 
Democratic representatives in the congressional House.   
Table 3: Federal Political Variable Factor Loadings 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Voted for Obama 2008 .7298 .1513 
State Political Ideology .7866 -.0764 
Republican Senators in Congress -.9564 .1177 
Democratic Senators in Congress .9564 -.1177 
Republican Representatives in 
congressional House 
-.0526 .8016 
Democratic Representatives in 
congressional House 
.3962 .6598 
Margin of Victory in 2008 Presidential 
Election 
.1962 -.2269 
 
Table 4 below demonstrates the factor loadings for my state political variables.  Factor 
#1 is most highly loaded with the party affiliation of the governor, the number of Democratic 
senators in the state legislature, and the number Democratic representatives in the state 
House.  Factor #2 is more highly loaded with number of Republican representatives in the state 
House and the number of Democratic representatives in the state House. 
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Table 4: State Political Variable Factor Loadings 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
State Governor Party Affiliation .6431 .0739 
State Republican Senators -.3842 .3408 
State Democratic Senators .8065 -.0945 
State Republican Representatives in 
House 
-.2198 .7686 
State Democratic Representatives in 
House 
.7246 .4725 
Professional Legislature .3257 -.0424 
 
Weibull Regression Model  
Table 5 shows the results of my multivariate Weibull regression model: 
Table 5: Weibull Model Results 
Variable Hazard Ratio P- value 
Federal Political Factor Score #1 1.38 .595 
Federal Political Factor Score #2 1.32 .465 
State Political Factor Score #1 3.72 .048** 
State Political Factor Score #2 .37 .102 
Percentage of Uninsured .71 .432 
Percentage of Diabetes 1.72 .545 
Government Performance Project Grades .83 .779 
Gross Domestic Product per Capita 1.0 .856 
Time parameter: .80 
Observations = 49 
** p<.05 
The results show that my first state political factor score is statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level.  Specifically, this factor score is most highly loaded with Democratic 
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senators and representatives in the state House and governor party affiliation.  Thus, a positive 
hazard ratio of demonstrates that states with more Democrats in a state’s executive and 
legislative offices  were 3.8 times more likely to adopt state-based exchange legislation before 
the deadline.  This result supports my alternative hypothesis.  Overall, the Weibull model shows 
that state-level political characteristics were more influential in time to adoption than those at 
the federal level.  Measures of state capacity, the size of a state’s health market, and gross 
domestic product did not demonstrate significance.  In addition, the Weibull model’s time 
parameter of .80 indicates that the overall time to adoption in all states began to decline as the 
June 28th, 2012 deadline approached.   
Conclusions 
 The results of my Kaplan-Meier and Weibull survival analyses produced mixed results in 
support of my hypothesis.  The majority of the variable results in support of my hypothesis 
were aligned with political considerations.  Specifically, it was found that states with the 
following characteristics were quicker to adopt measures to implement stated-based 
exchanges: voted for Obama in 2008, a liberal political ideology, more Democratic senators in 
Congress, more Democratic senators in the Congressional House, a decisive margin of victory 
for Obama in 2008, a Democratic governor, more Democratic representatives in the state 
House of Representatives, more Democratic senators in the state legislature, higher grades on 
the Government Performance Project, and higher levels of gross domestic product per capita.  
In general, it demonstrates that political attributes in a state appear to have contributed to 
time of early adoption. Other variables, such as my weighted variables for size of the healthcare 
 32 
market in a state, did not demonstrate the results I anticipated.  A higher percentage of 
uninsured residents or diabetic residents did not speed time to adoption as assumed.  With the 
latter variable, the effect of regional political influences may have played a part in influencing 
the relationship. A full-time state legislature also did not demonstrate a quicker time to 
adoption than part-time legislatures.  In turn, this state capacity measure did not correspond as 
hypothesized with overall state capacity grades within the Government Performance Project.   
 Within the context of these findings, my Weibull model finds a statistically significant 
relationship between Democrats at the state-level and time to adoption.  This seems to indicate 
that the decision to adopt a state-based exchange prior to the Supreme Court decision laid with 
a state’s political composition as opposed to federal political factors, state administrative 
capacities, or the market for healthcare insurance.  While the decision being influenced by state 
political considerations is not surprising, it was interesting that federal level political 
characteristics did not demonstrate a closer relationship in the results. 
 The results of my study can potentially be used as a contributor to the literature on 
partisanship policy-making or function as initial baseline evidence of the appearance of 
relationships between common political characteristics and healthcare mandates. In the event 
that regulatory and subsidy coverage complications do arise in the months ahead, this study 
can be used to examine state characteristics that may have influenced, to some degree, early  
decision-making, serving as a small reference point for study.  Further research of a more 
robust nature could include more socio-economic variables associated with individual and 
statewide health opinions, such as other health risk rates, interest group activity, and per capita 
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income.  Another possible similar analysis could involve examining determinants that may have 
played a part in a state’s decision regarding which type of structure to pursue for state-based 
exchanges. 
Limitations 
 Due to the nature of the study focusing on a time specific determinant, the scope of the 
results is limited.  Much of the data used was taken at one point in time, with the majority of 
the collection occurring from 2011 data, which was the year in the middle of the analysis 
window.  Thus, characteristics of states at the actual time of adoption may not be fully 
incorporated into the models and also may not be generalizable to similar studies.    One 
particular source of data, state political ideology, reflects this limitation.  The state political 
ideology index used focuses on average interest group ratings from members of Congress for 
2010.  The validity of this methodology seems to fall in line with previous discussion of state 
opinion influencing elected officials’ decisions but only relies on one specific measure to 
compile index ratings. It is possible that other methodologies for calculating ideology may yield 
somewhat different relationships.   
A similar possible limitation involves the categorical assignment of many continuous 
variables in my model in order to complete a Kaplan-Meier survival analysis.  Other survival 
techniques that serve a similar analytical purpose may have been more appropriate for these 
types of variables, though the Weibull survival analysis conducted in my study did attempt to 
address the individual significance of each variable in relation to the Kaplan-Meier results. In 
addition, the time constraints of completing this project precluded that other political and 
 34 
socio-economic variables were not included, which may have painted a clearer overall picture 
of certain relationships. 
